After the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would shift its
tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a minority within the Brotherhood has
decided to take up arms. While most policy attention focuses on the causes of
radicalization, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important
question: why, despite the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against
the Muslim Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The answer
is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of the costs of
violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as non-violent.
The removal
of President Mohammed Morsi, a Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and
the ensuing crackdown by the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the
group between the historical leadership, which has insisted on using
non-violent means to resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use
of limited violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In
January 2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably
from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However, the
old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this revolutionary approach
and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own men to
higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various administrative offices.
In addition, it played the financial card to put pressure on those who were
supporting the new leadership strategy. The position of the historical
leadership is influenced by two main factors: pressure from the Muslim
Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any level of violence in order to protect
the image of the Brotherhood as a non-violent movement, and the desire to
prevent the new leadership from extending its control over the organization.
Many
Brotherhood members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They
know that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This is
particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial support, for
the supply of arms as well as for the families of members who are killed or
imprisoned because of their use of violence. Additionally, many of the
Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going against the Egyptian regime,
having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist groups that tried to challenge the
state authority in the 1980s and 1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also
framed the Muslim Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the
Muslim Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of
violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim
Brotherhood for over 40 years. While there is an internal ideological
debate over whether the organization allows the use of violence or not, over
the past four decades the Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach
of using political violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas
into its membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on
their stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official member if
there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority of the
Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using political
violence. But it is also important to note that these factors do not have the
same influence over the different groups affiliated with the Brotherhood, and
might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly those
who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who spent two
years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes that, after 2013,
over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his prison had become more
willing to use political violence. The leadership does not have the same level
of influence on newer members, who have only been with the organization for a
few years and have not developed the same pattern of respect and obedience to
their superiors. For many, who have dropped out of education and share with
many younger Egyptians the belief that they have little future prospects, there
is much less to lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once
released, they will represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership
to reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of this
ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over leadership
and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime might make the
message of violence more attractive to more members in future.
In the meantime, Ahmad Nur ad-Din investigates the phenomenon of young members of the Ikhwan falling into apathy and sinful behaviour. According to their own statements, a large majority of their Ikhwan social circle has become inactive: https://www.sasapost.com/the-nihilist-brotherhood-from-banna-paper-to-bafra/
...
منذ أحداث الثالث من يوليو (تموز)
في مصر وما أعقبها، تناولت العديد من المواد الصحافية والبحثية ظاهرة شباب
الإخوان الذين تحولوا بعد الأحداث الجسام التي لحقت بهم وبجماعتهم في تجاه
الإرهاب والعنف، لكن ما لم يسلط عليه الضوء هو ذلك القطاع الكبير منهم
الذي اتجه إلى الطريق العكسي تمامًا؛ العدمية التامة، وهو ما سيحاول هذا
التحقيق المكون من حلقتين، تسليط الضوء عليه.
إخوان إخوان؟
أي محفل جمعك من قبل أو تصورت أنه قد يجمعك يومًا بشباب جماعة الإخوان المسلمين؟
مظاهرة؟
مسجد؟ حملة خيرية؟ أسرة طلابية بالجامعة؟ أغلب الظن أنك لن تجتمع بهم في
محفل كالذي شهدته متوسطًا جلسة في شقة يسكنها عدد منهم، يتداولون فيما
بينهم سجائر الحشيش بشكلها المخروطي المألوف بعدما أعدها أحدهم بمهارة،
جلست أراقب في دهشة «كلكم إخوان مسلمين؟»، (سنستعير ها هنا اسمي «حذيفة»
و«خالد» استجابة لرغبتهما في الاحتفاظ بسرية الهويات لاثنين منهم
سيشاركاننا الحديث خلال السطور القادمة).
أجابني حذيفة «كلنا»، وأردف
ضاحكًا: «أبناء المؤسسة إن شئت استخدام مصطلحنا التنظيمي»، أسأل ثانية:
«متى انضممتم للجماعة؟» فيروي أنه لم تكن لديه بداية؛ جاء إلى الحياة ليجد
عائلتيه من جهتي الأب والأم من أعضاء الجماعة، فنشأ هكذا، وأحب الفكرة
وأقبل عليها.
يختلف خالد عن حذيفة، فقد انضم إلى الجماعة برغبة وقرار
شخصي منه في سن المراهقة، ويشترك الاثنان في التزامهما التنظيمي
وانخراطهما في نشاط الجماعة حتى أواخر عام 2015 تقريبًا، الاثنان نجيا من
أحداث فض اعتصام رابعة العدوية، وشاركا فيما تلاها من تحركات للجماعة
بالتزام تنظيمي كامل، وأكدا تمسكهما به رغم ما نالهما من أضرار جراء هذه
الفاعليات، أقلها التأخر في الدراسة إما بالإضراب عنها، أو بالفصل من
الجامعة، وأعلاها ما نالهما من أحكام بالسجن، مرابطين على أمل انفراج
الأزمة التي تمر بها الجماعة في صراعها مع الدولة المصرية منذ عزل الرئيس
محمد مرسي في بيان الثالث من يوليو (تموز) 2013.
«وما زلتم أبناء
المؤسسة؟»، يقول حذيفة إنه لو كان ثمة حصر ستجريه الجماعة لأعضائها فسوف
يكونان معدودين ضمن هذا الحصر، لكن العلاقة التنظيمية والتواصل الإداري مع
قيادات الجماعة الآن «صفر في المائة، علاقتنا بالجماعة حاليًا لا تتجاوز
عاطفة تجاه أناس تربينا وسطهم وأحببناهم، علاقات اجتماعية شخصية بحكم
العشرة فقط، نحن ننتمي لهم، حتى أنني لو فكرت في الزواج سأتزوج من بينهم،
هذا هو المجتمع الذي تربينا وعشنا فيه، وفيه نجد أنفسنا ونجد أناسًا
يشبهوننا ويفهموننا، هذه كل علاقتنا بهم الآن».
لا
يقتصر نمط الحياة الجديد لدى حذيفة وإخوانه على تدخين السجائر أو حتى
الحشيش، فالمشروبات الكحولية حاضرة أحيانًا، وحتى انفتاح العلاقات على
الجنس الآخر، ليس فقط لمجرد إقامة صداقات بريئة، وإنما أحيانًا لمحاولة حتى
إقامة علاقات جنسية. هذه الحياة، التي بدأت لديهم في فترات تتراوح ما بين
أواخر عام 2015 وأوائل 2016، تبدو وكأنها لم تتحرر فقط من القيود التنظيمية
للجماعة، وإنما حتى من الوازع الديني للأخلاق.
«يمكنك
القول إنها علمانية ولكن غير فكرية، علمانية أخلاقية»، يضيف حذيفة ويشرح:
«لم أعد أضع لنفسي القيود التي كنت أضعها سابقًا، ربما لن أكذب أو أسرق
مثلًا، لكن ممكن أدخن أو أصاحب بنات، لم أعد أصلي تقريبًا إلا حينما تضطرني
الضرورة للحرج من شخص ما».
ربما أصبح ملحًا أن نفهم الآن ما الذي قد
يقود مجموعة من شباب التنظيم الإسلامي الأكبر حجمًا والأوسع نفوذًا في
العالم لانتهاج هذا النمط من الحياة، في ظرفه التاريخي الأصعب، وأن نحاول
أيضًا معرفة حجم هذا التوجه في صفوفهم.
لجنة فبراير: المحطة الأخيرة
في شهر فبراير من عام 2014 تشكلت ما سميت بـ «لجنة فبراير»
لإدارة الأزمة بجماعة الإخوان المسلمين، بهدف الخروج بالجماعة من الأزمة
التاريخية التي تهدد وجودها بالكامل في مواجهة النظام المصري، خاصةً مع
اعتقال عدد كبير من قياداتها وعلى رأسهم المرشد العام «محمد بديع».
تولى
قيادة اللجنة عضو مكتب الإرشاد آنذاك «محمد كمال»، وفي منتصف العام نفسه
ظهرت بوادر خلاف بين أعضاء اللجنة من ناحية، وبين القيادة التاريخية
للجماعة من ناحية أخرى، على رأسها محمود عزت،
نائب المرشد، ومحمود حسين، الأمين العام للجماعة، تعلق الخلاف بمنهجية
العمل التنظيمي للجماعة خلال تلك الفترة، بين لجنة فبراير، التي ترى ضرورة
تبني «المنهج الثوري المبدع»، وتكوين لجان نوعية تتمثل مهمتها فيما تصفه
بمقاومة ما أسموه بـ «الانقلاب» بالسلاح دفاعًا عن النفس، وبين القيادة
التاريخية للجماعة، التي ترى ضرورة الاستمرار على منهج السلمية؛ حفاظًا على
تماسك الجماعة من وجهة نظرها.
وبينما
حاز جناح القيادة التاريخية تأييد ما يسمى بالتنظيم الدولي للجماعة، فإن
جناح لجنة فبراير قد حاز تأييد جانب كبير من قواعد الجماعة وعدد من المكاتب
الإدارية للمحافظات المصرية، من بينهم محدثونا الذين أظهروا سخطًا كبيرًا
على جناح القيادة التاريخية. يشبّه حذيفة استراتيجية هذا الجناح في إدارة
الجماعة بإعطاء مسكن البنادول لمريض سرطان، ويقول: «مجرد مسكنات تافهة، لا
هي تستطيع أبدًا التعامل مع حجم الألم، ولا أنت تتخذ قرارًا لإجراء تدخل
جراحي للمريض».
بعد إلحاح في السؤال، يصرّحان أنهما قد سبق لهما
الانضمام للمجموعات المكلفة بالقيام بعمليات نوعية عنيفة ضد قوات الأمن،
ينضم إليهما اثنان آخران من جلساء الأنس في هذا الاعتراف، ويكتفون به
رافضين ذكر أي تفاصيل، غير أنهم يتفقون على أن هذا الجناح في الجماعة بدوره
تميز بالعشوائية والاندفاع، وغياب التخطيط، وقلة الخبرة والإمكانات.
بالإضافة
لذلك يعلن ثلاثة منهم تراجعهم ورفضهم الحالي لهذا المسار؛ فقد وصفه أحدهم
بأنه «غير صالح للواقع المصري لأسباب تاريخية وجغرافية واجتماعية وسياسية»،
بينما يصر رابعهم على أنه المسار الصحيح لو توافرت له الإمكانات والتخطيط
المناسب، وأن المصالحة لا تجوز بعد كل ما سال من دماء.
في كل الحالات
كانت لجنة فبراير هي محطة الجميع الأخيرة قبل اتخاذ القرار بالتوقف تمامًا
عن المشاركة في أنشطة الجماعة، إلا أنهم قبل الوصول لهذه المحطة كان بعضهم
قد تم اتهامه بالفعل في عدد من القضايا، قالوا إنها تتعلق بأحداث لم
يشاركوا فيها. أحدهم حُكِم عليه غيابيًّا بالسجن عشر سنوات، وآخر حصل على
مجموع أحكام غيابية جاوزت الستين عامًا، ما جعله يعيش الآن مطاردًا يغير
مكان سكنه كل فترة، ولم يتمكن من زيارة أهله منذ أكثر من عامين.
انسحاب غير معلن.. «لماذا كل هذه الجدية؟!»
مع
تصاعد الخلاف بين جناحي الأزمة في الجماعة الذي بلغ حد الانقسام بين طرفين
يتبادلان الاتهامات، وقرارات تجميد العضوية والإحالات للتحقيق، فضلًا عن
عدم اعتراف كل منهما بشرعية الآخر مسؤولًا عن الجماعة، سيطر الإحباط على
هؤلاء الشباب وتدرج انسحابهم من نشاط الجماعة.
يقول
خالد: «اكتشفت أن الجماعة نظامها عقيم، القيادات أغلبهم يسعى لمصالح
شخصية، والمنظومة فاسدة من الداخل، والعمل على الأرض عشوائي، ولا يؤدي إلا
إلى المزيد من الخسائر والضحايا»، ويضيف: «كنت أعطي الجماعة الأولوية في
حياتي على حساب دراستي وعملي، وكنت مستعدًا لأي تضحية لو أنني أرى نتائج
ملموسة على أرض الواقع، وغيري من أعضاء الجماعة ضحوا بحريتهم، أو وظائفهم،
أو مستقبلهم التعليمي، أو عاشوا مطاردين، أو حتى تعرضوا للقتل، لكن الحقيقة
أن كل التضحيات كانت تضيع هباءً، الجماعة تتراجع إلى الخلف، بينما النظام
يقوي صفوفه ويثبت وجوده بمرور الوقت، وهذا الفشل يرجع بالأساس لسوء الإدارة
في الجماعة، وغياب الفكر والرؤية، فقررت أن أتوقف وأحاول التعايش مع
الواقع».
سألته إن كان قد واجه مسؤوليه في الجماعة بقرار الانسحاب،
فقال إن ذلك لم يحدث مباشرة حاكيًا: «بدأت الرفض والاعتذار عن المشاركة
بالتدريج بحجج مختلفة، حتى فقدوا الأمل، وأنا لم أعد مهتمًا حتى بما يدور
داخل الجماعة، كل ما يهمني هو خروج المعتقلين من السجون، وبخلاف ذلك
فليحلوا هم مشاكلهم مع بعضهم».
«نقاط سوداء في جلباب أبيض»
يلتقط
حذيفة طرف الحديث لينطلق قائلًا: «أنا كنت أظن أن جماعة الإخوان حتى وإن
مارست بعض الأخطاء فهي لا تعدو كونها أخطاء بشرية، لم أتصور أن المسألة
تتجاوز فكرة الخطأ البشري لفكرة الفساد، ولم أتصور مطلقًا أن يكون فسادًا
بهذا الحجم، لم تعد الصورة كما كانت في ذهني جلبابًا أبيض بدون نقطة سوداء»
ويتابع: «كثيرون اكتشفت أن الهدف الوحيد من دخولهم الجماعة هو الوصول
لمناصب، وتحقيق مكاسب مادية، وكثيرون من وصلوا لمناصب غير مؤهلين لها نتيجة
الفساد الإداري بالجماعة، والإعلام الإخواني ماذا يقدم أو يفعل غير ترويج
المخدرات الفكرية؟».
يسحب
نفسًا من السيجارة، ثم يشرح ما بدا من حدة في لهجته، وسيل الاتهامات التي
وجهها: «قنوات الإخوان مثلًا يصرف عليها من أموال أعضاء الجماعة التي تجمع
لدعم أهالي المعتقلين والشهداء، وهذه الأموال تستخدمها قيادة الجناح
التاريخي للجماعة في الضغط على المخالفين لها من مكاتب وأعضاء الجماعة،
الأموال التي يقتطعها أعضاء الجماعة من أقوات بيوتهم لأجل أن تصرف في طريق
واحد، وهو دعم أهالي المعتقلين والشهداء، أنت تستخدمها في دفع مرتبات بآلاف
الدولارات لإعلاميين بعضهم كان أصلًا ضد الإخوان، وساهم في الحشد للانقلاب
عليهم، وتلوي بها ذراع المكاتب الإدارية التي لا تتبع جبهتك، وتوقف الدعم
عن المعتقلين وبيوتهم، هذا حدث بالفعل في محافظة الفيوم».
ويستطرد:
«أعرف شخصًا والده مطارد أمنيًّا، وليس لدى أسرته مصدر دخل سوى ما توفره
الجماعة من دعم مادي، هذا الشخص توقف عن المشاركة في السلاسل البشرية التي
تنظمها الجماعة لأنه رأى أنها لا تحقق أي فائدة، ورغم أنه يتبع محافظة تتبع
الجناح التاريخي للجماعة بقيادة محمود عزت ومحمود حسين، إلا أن الجماعة
أوقفت الدعم عنه بسبب توقفه عن المشاركة في نشاطها، مما اضطره للعودة
للنشاط عن غير رغبة أو اقتناع منه، حتى أنه توقف عن التصريح بآرائه الشخصية
على فيسبوك».
يواصل كلامه: «أشياء كثيرة مثل هذه تكشفت لي في
الطريق، فأوقفت نشاطي تمامًا، شكرًا خلاص، كان لديك طاقة شاب وحياته كانت
مسخرة كلها في سبيل فكرة معينة، ثم شوهتها أنت، ولم أجد نفسي في شيء آخر،
فأصبحت كما ترى، لا أتحرك حاليًا دون علبة سجائري، أدخن الحشيش بانتظام،
جربت الكحول عدة مرات، توقفت عن الصلاة، أسعى لصداقة الفتيات، وأحيانًا حتى
للدخول في علاقة جنسية، ورغم ذلك ما زلت مقتنعًا بحرمانية ما أسلكه في
حياتي الجديدة».
الفكر غلَّاب
إزاء ما ذكروه من
اعتراضات حادة ضد منظومة الجماعة، وسلوكيات مخالفة لمنهجها كل الخلاف،
سألتهم إن كانوا ما يزالون على اقتناعهم بأفكارها أم أن التحول طال فكر
الجماعة نفسه؟ يقول حذيفة: «الأصول والأفكار العامة ما زالت موجودة، يعني
أفكار الخلافة، وتحكيم الشريعة مثلًا، فكرة الحاكمية لله، وفكرة الحرية
بمعناها الشامل التي أراها فريضة إسلامية أصلًا، بمعنى ألا يكون لأحد سلطان
عليك غير ضميرك وإيمانك بالله. بشكل عام الدوافع التي تحرك فكري ما زالت
هي الدوافع الإسلامية وأفكار الجماعة، أما مدى تطبيقنا لها الآن فهو شيء
منفصل، لم يحدث لنا تحول على المستوى الفكري، ربما فقط بدأت أرى الأمور من
منظور أوسع ولم تعد لدي العصبية في النظرة للآخر التي كانت لدي من قبل».
أسأله
إن كان هذا التحول يشبه التحولات التي حدثت لمجموعات من شباب الجماعة
انفصلوا عنها في عامي 2011 و2012 في أعقاب ثورة 25 يناير (كانون الثاني)،
فيما وصفته الجماعة ذات مرة بأنه «تلفظ خبثها»؟ فيجيبني: «ما حدث لنا هو
تحول نفسي وأخلاقي بالأساس، أما تلك المجموعات فقد كان تحولها فكريًّا
بالدرجة الأولى، حتى وإن نتج عنه تحول أخلاقي في بعض الحالات فإنه كان
تحولًا أخلاقيًّا ناتجًا عن قناعات فكرية جديدة، الحالة هنا مختلفة،
بالإضافة لأنهم كانوا نسبة ضئيلة، أنا شخصيًّا عرفت ثلاثة أو أربعة أشخاص
فقط تحولوا في تلك الفترة، أما الآن فالنسبة أكبر بكثير».
كم تبلغ نسبة «الحشاشين» في الجماعة؟
أردت
معرفة إن كان ما وجدت نفسي بصدده يمثل ظاهرةً، أو حالة عامة بين شباب
وأعضاء الجماعة. لا تتوفر طريقة إحصائية مناسبة لقياس نسبة هذا التحول، لذا
لم يكن متاحًا الاعتماد إلا على ما يرصده هؤلاء الشبان في دوائرهم
بالجماعة، طلبت إجابة منفردة من كل واحد من الجالسين، وفي وقت لاحق اعتمدنا
على شهادة آخر من الجماعة في جولة وسط بعض شبابها بجامعة الأزهر لاستطلاع
رأيهم، ليس فقط حول موقفهم الشخصي من هذا الاتجاه، وإنما أيضًا حول نسبة
وجوده بين معارفهم من أعضاء الجماعة.
الغريب أن الكل اتفق على أن
نسبة من توقفوا عن نشاطهم بالجماعة تمامًا لا تقل عن 95%، بعضهم حتى سخر من
تقدير نسبة الملتزمين تنظيمّيًا بـ 5% واعتبرها مبالغة، أحدهم قال إن من
يشارك الآن يكون مضطرًا أو مجبرًا، غير أن إجاباتهم تباينت في تفصيل هؤلاء
الـ95%، فيما يمكن إجماله كالتالي:
تراوحت تقديراتهم في نسبة ما بين
20 و40% ما زالوا محافظين على أخلاقيات الجماعة والتزامهم الديني، ونسبة
تتراوح ما بين 40 و50% اهتز التزامهم الديني والأخلاقي إلى حدود من قبيل
التدخين أو إقامة صداقات مع الجنس الآخر، ونسبة تتراوح ما بين 10 و40%
تجاوزت ذلك إلى سلوكيات من نوعية تعاطي الحشيش وشرب الكحول وإقامة علاقات
جنسية، أو ما وصفه أحدهم ساخرًا بمرتكبي الكبائر، تفرقة لهم عن سواهم ممن
اكتفوا بما دون ذلك من «الصغائر».
يقول خالد: «حتى هؤلاء المحافظون
على التزامهم قد صاروا أكثر تقبلًا لحدوث هذه التغيرات، ولم يعد يصدمهم أو
يغضب أحدهم مثلًا لو رأى إخوانه قد تحولوا كذلك».
أترضاه لأختك؟
حاولنا
أن تكون المصادر التي نرصد من خلالها الظاهرة محل التحقيق أكثر تنوعًا،
سألت حذيفة إن كان بإمكاني التواصل مع بعض فتيات الجماعة اللاتي ربما يكن
قد مررن بتحولات مشابهة، فقال إن نسبة هذه التحولات لدى الفتيات ضئيلة
جدًّا، ربما لا تتجاوز الحالات الفردية، وأن التواصل معهن لن يكون ممكنًا.
سألته
إن كان يعرف فتيات مررن بنفس التجربة؛ فأجاب: «أعرف بنتًا من الجماعة جربت
تدخين الحشيش، وأعرف حالات لولا أنها مسائل أعراض كنت حكيت لك وقائع
شهدتها شخصيًّا ولم تنقل لي»، قبل أن يستطرد بلهجة مذنبة: «ما زلت أعتبر أن
بنات الإخوان يمتن لي بصلة، أنت ممكن تصيع برة لكن مش هتصيع مع أختك، أنا
أرى أن بنات الإخوان هن عِرضي وشرفي، وأنزعج جدًّا ويفور دمي إذا عرفت أن
بنتًا من بنات الإخوان مارست مثل هذه السلوكيات، ﻷن الرابطة الإنسانية على
أعلى درجة كما أخبرتك، لو عرفت أن فتاة من الإخوان سارت في هذا الطريق لن
أحب ذلك وسأسعى لتغييرها، حتى لو لم تكن لي صلة بها سأحاول تنبيه أحد
معارفها».
«عاوزنا نرجع زي زمان؟»
لماذا لم يستقيلوا من
الجماعة؟ وهل يوجد لديهم احتمال أو رغبة في العودة لممارسة نشاطهم بها
يومًا ما؟ قالوا إنهم ربما يريدون أن يتركوا خط رجعة لاحتمالية العودة،
بالإضافة لأن الاستقالة من عدمها لن تفيد أو تضر في شيء، فضلًا عن أنه لا
يوجد هيكل إداري مستقر يمكن إعلامه بالانفصال عن الجماعة، كما اتفقوا على
أولوية خروج المعتقلين
قبل أي حديث عن إمكانية عودتهم للصفوف، واتفقوا أيضًا على ضرورة تنحية
قيادة الجناح التاريخي للجماعة كلية، يقول خالد: «هؤلاء كانوا سبب الأزمة
ولن يكونوا حلًّا للمشكلة، قيادتهم على مدار 30 عامًا هي التي أوصلت
الجماعة لهذا السقوط، لا المنطق ولا الأخلاق تقبل أن يستمروا في إدارة
الجماعة، لا نريد منهم شيئًا، سنعتبرهم مجتهدين أخطؤوا، بإمكانهم قضاء باقي
حيواتهم في المساجد يستغفرون الله على ما صنعوا، لكنهم شركاء في الأزمة
وفي كل الدم الذي سال بسوء إدارتهم»، مواصلًا حديثه بسب القيادات.
يضع
حذيفة شرطًا إضافيًّا: «أنا شخصيًّا أحتاج أولًا لتأهيل نفسي، أحتاج
لاستعادة نفسي واستعادة أشياء كثيرة ضاعت مني، ثم نرى ما يمكن عمله، هل
ستعالج الجماعة أخطاءها؟ كيف ستعمل وفي أي إطار؟ هل ستفصل العمل الدعوي عن
الحزبي؟ ستتوقف عن العمل بالسياسة تمامًا؟ سنرى وقتها، لكن بالتأكيد من
المستحيل قطعًا أن نعود لما كنا عليه».
لكنهما اختلفا حول الشكل الذي
يراه كل منهما مناسبًا لعودة نشاط الجماعة، خالد من ناحية يصر على أن
العنف هو الطريق الوحيد الذي ينبغي على الجماعة أن تسلكه، فالعنف لا يقاوم
إلا بالعنف، ولا مصالحة على الدماء من وجهة نظره، أما حذيفة فيرى أنه لا حل
إلا المصالحة، فالحلول العنيفة لن تكون صالحة للتطبيق في مصر.
ويستطرد
حذيفة: «لكن المصالحة لكي تتم لا بد أن تكون بين طرفين متساويين أو
متقاربين في القوة، لكن الوضع الآن أن هناك طرفًا قويًّا وطرفًا ضعيفًا
تمامًا، فالطرف الضعيف ينبغي عليه أن يقبل بأي حل، لكن المشكلة أن الدولة
لا تقدم عروضًا للمصالحة، لأنها لا تريد التصالح مع الجماعة أصلًا،
والجماعة كل مدى تعود إلى الخلف أكثر، بينما الدولة تواصل تقدمها، السيسي
قال لياسر علي في اجتماع بعد الانقلاب أنا جئت لأنجح فيما فشل فيه عبد
الناصر، فالنظام لا يريد المصالحة، والجماعة غير موحدة على رأي واحد،
والذين يقولون لا للمصالحة لا يقدمون بديلًا، والذين يقولون نعم للمصالحة
لا يقدمون وسيلة، فأنا شخصيًّا لا أعرف الحل، ربما تأتي المصالحة حينما يجد
جديد في الوضع السياسي الداخلي أو العالمي، يجعل النظام يرى أنه يحتاج إلى
الإخوان، أو إلى الاستقرار، ربما حتى يخرج الناس لتغيير النظام، لكن
الجماعة لن تكون فاعلًا في إنهاء أزمتها مع النظام، المبادرة ليست في يدها،
لا تملك إلا الانتظار ورد الفعل».
من بين الاثنين يعلو صوت ثالث
لأحد الشباب، يبدو الأكثر تشاؤمًا بمستقبل الجماعة: «الجماعة لن تعود مرة
أخرى، حتى لو خرجت من هذه الأزمة مثلما خرجت في عهد السادات من الأزمة التي
مرت بها في عهد عبد الناصر، الجماعة الآن بها من الفساد والخيانة الداخلية
ما يمنع عودتها كالسابق، هؤلاء المنقسمون وصل الأمر ببعضهم إلى التعاون مع
الأمن لتسليم قيادات الجناح المخالف، فعن أي عودة نتحدث؟».
انتظرونا في الجزء الثاني الذي يحتوي على رد القيادات على آراء الشباب ها هنا.
After
the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would
shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a
minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most
policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite
the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim
Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The
answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of
the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as
non-violent.
The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a
Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensuing crackdown by
the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the group between the
historical leadership, which has insisted on using non-violent means to
resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use of limited
violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In January
2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.ReO0xmbt.sLVN4IET.dpuf
After
the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would
shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a
minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most
policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite
the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim
Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The
answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of
the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as
non-violent.
The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a
Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensuing crackdown by
the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the group between the
historical leadership, which has insisted on using non-violent means to
resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use of limited
violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In January
2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.ReO0xmbt.sLVN4IET.dpuf
Even
in the face of Egypt’s growing security crackdown, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s history, leadership and understanding of the costs of
violence have kept its membership remarkably peaceful.
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supporters march during the vote on a new constitution on 14 January 2014. Photo: Getty Images.
After the 2013
military intervention against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would shift its tactics
to include the use of violence. However, only a minority within the
Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most policy attention
focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
raises an equally important question: why, despite the measures adopted
by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim Brotherhood, has only a
small minority turned to violence?
The answer is threefold: the
position of the leadership, a recognition of the costs of violence and
the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as non-violent.
The removal of
President Mohammed Morsi, a Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013
and the ensuing crackdown by the Egyptian authorities led to a split
within the group between the historical leadership, which has insisted
on using non-violent means to resist the regime, and newer leaders who
advocated the use of limited violence, or what they call a ‘painful
nonviolent’ approach. In January 2015, this newer leadership began to
promote a strategy to escalate violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.JzbNDpja.dpuf
After
the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would
shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a
minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most
policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite
the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim
Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The
answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of
the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as
non-violent.
The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a
Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensuing crackdown by
the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the group between the
historical leadership, which has insisted on using non-violent means to
resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use of limited
violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In January
2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.ReO0xmbt.sLVN4IET.dpuf
After
the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would
shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a
minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most
policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite
the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim
Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The
answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of
the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as
non-violent.
The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a
Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensuing crackdown by
the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the group between the
historical leadership, which has insisted on using non-violent means to
resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use of limited
violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In January
2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.ReO0xmbt.sLVN4IET.dpuf
After
the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would
shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a
minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most
policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite
the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim
Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The
answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of
the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as
non-violent.
The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a
Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensuing crackdown by
the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the group between the
historical leadership, which has insisted on using non-violent means to
resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use of limited
violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In January
2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.ReO0xmbt.sLVN4IET.dpuf
After
the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would
shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a
minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most
policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite
the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim
Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The
answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of
the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as
non-violent.
The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a
Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensuing crackdown by
the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the group between the
historical leadership, which has insisted on using non-violent means to
resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use of limited
violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In January
2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.ReO0xmbt.sLVN4IET.dpufv
After
the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would
shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a
minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most
policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite
the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim
Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The
answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of
the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as
non-violent.
The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a
Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensuing crackdown by
the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the group between the
historical leadership, which has insisted on using non-violent means to
resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use of limited
violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In January
2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.ReO0xmbt.sLVN4IET.dpuf
After
the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would
shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a
minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most
policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite
the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim
Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The
answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of
the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as
non-violent.
The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a
Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensuing crackdown by
the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the group between the
historical leadership, which has insisted on using non-violent means to
resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use of limited
violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In January
2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.ReO0xmbt.sLVN4IET.dpuf
After
the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would
shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a
minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most
policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite
the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim
Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?
The
answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of
the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as
non-violent.
The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a
Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensuing crackdown by
the Egyptian authorities led to a split within the group between the
historical leadership, which has insisted on using non-violent means to
resist the regime, and newer leaders who advocated the use of limited
violence, or what they call a ‘painful nonviolent’ approach. In January
2015, this newer leadership began to promote a strategy to escalate
violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.ReO0xmbt.sLVN4IET.dpuf
Even
in the face of Egypt’s growing security crackdown, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s history, leadership and understanding of the costs of
violence have kept its membership remarkably peaceful.
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supporters march during the vote on a new constitution on 14 January 2014. Photo: Getty Images.
After the 2013
military intervention against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would shift its tactics
to include the use of violence. However, only a minority within the
Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most policy attention
focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
raises an equally important question: why, despite the measures adopted
by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim Brotherhood, has only a
small minority turned to violence?
The answer is threefold: the
position of the leadership, a recognition of the costs of violence and
the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as non-violent.
The removal of
President Mohammed Morsi, a Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013
and the ensuing crackdown by the Egyptian authorities led to a split
within the group between the historical leadership, which has insisted
on using non-violent means to resist the regime, and newer leaders who
advocated the use of limited violence, or what they call a ‘painful
nonviolent’ approach. In January 2015, this newer leadership began to
promote a strategy to escalate violent attacks throughout the year, and violence increased considerably from January to July 2015. (opens in new window) However,
the old leadership interfered in order to put an end to this
revolutionary approach and to restore its control over the Brotherhood.
The
historical leadership used its organizational skills to promote its own
men to higher positions in order to control the Brotherhood’s various
administrative offices. In addition, it played the financial card to put
pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership strategy. The
position of the historical leadership is influenced by two main factors:
pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any
level of violence in order to protect the image of the Brotherhood as a
non-violent movement, and the desire to prevent the new leadership from
extending its control over the organization.
Many Brotherhood
members approach the idea of the use of violence rationally. They know
that the cost of using violence is much higher than its benefits. This
is particularly because the historical leadership withholds financial
support, for the supply of arms as well as for the families of members
who are killed or imprisoned because of their use of violence.
Additionally, many of the Brotherhood’s members know the cost of going
against the Egyptian regime, having witnessed the defeat of the Islamist
groups that tried to challenge the state authority in the 1980s and
1990s. Experiences outside Egypt have also framed the Muslim
Brotherhood’s choices, such as the confrontation between the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which the Syrian
regime violently defeated the movement.
Rejection of violence has also been a key part of the institutional ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood for over 40 years. While
there is an internal ideological debate over whether the organization
allows the use of violence or not, over the past four decades the
Brotherhood has preached against the jihadi approach of using political
violence. Moreover, it has institutionalized these ideas into its
membership rules. Members are accepted or rejected partly based on their
stance towards the use of violence, and there have traditionally been
clear orders to not promote any sympathizer to the level of official
member if there were any doubts about their views on the issue.
These
factors have an important influence over the attitudes of the majority
of the Muslim Brothers and have led most of them to refrain from using
political violence. But it is also important to note that these factors
do not have the same influence over the different groups affiliated with
the Brotherhood, and might not have the same influence over time.
These
factors have weaker influence when it comes to the youth, particularly
those who have been jailed after 2013. A Muslim Brotherhood member who
spent two years in prison, speaking anonymously, said that he believes
that, after 2013, over 1 in 5 Muslim Brotherhood members inside his
prison had become more willing to use political violence. The leadership
does not have the same level of influence on newer members, who have
only been with the organization for a few years and have not developed
the same pattern of respect and obedience to their superiors. For many,
who have dropped out of education and share with many younger Egyptians
the belief that they have little future prospects, there is much less to
lose in turning to violence. And in prison, they are exposed to
jihadists and their ideology of violence.
Once released, they will
represent a challenge for the Muslim Brotherhood leadership to
reintegrate. So far, the leadership, the understanding of the limits of
violence and the Brotherhood’s history have all limited the influence of
this ideology. But wider disappointment about the ongoing struggle over
leadership and the lack of a coherent strategy to confront the regime
might make the message of violence more attractive to more members in
future.
- See more at:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.JzbNDpja.dpuf
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supporters march during the vote on a new constitution on 14 January 2014. Photo: Getty Images.
After the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence?- See more at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/why-aren-t-more-muslim-brothers-turning-violence#sthash.JzbNDpja.dpuf
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