Muslim Brotherhood Files

تصريح صحفي: "الإخوان المسلمون" تُصدر ورقة التوصيات الختامية للتقييمات بسم الله، والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله، وعلى آل... Posted by ‎ المتحدث الإعلامي باسم جماعة الإخوان المسلمين ‎ on  Saturday, 13 May 2017  The Kamal Front lays out its vision for the Muslim Brotherhood: (Point 3) Its institutions and bodies in its different fields of action ( should be professionalized and staffed with experts, without giving up the "Shumuliyya" of the Ikhwani approach. There should remain central control of all activities: (Point 5) A group of experts and intellectuals should be commissioned to formulate the political visions of the Muslim Brotherhood on the basis of Ikhwani thought and in harmony with the requirements of the age. (Point 6) The training of cadres and popular leaders should be intensified (Point 8) Better conflict resolution mechanisms within the Ikhwan (Point 9-10) The revolutionary trajectory (al-masar ath-thauri) should not be given up...

MadaMasr, Arabic version, 21.3.2017 MadaMasr, English version, 22.3.2017 Muhammad Kamal wing manifesto The Mohamed Kamal wing of the Muslim Brotherhood issued a report on Tuesday in which it took stock of the organization’s wider policies and strategic decisions in the leadup to the January 2011 revolution and the role it played afterwards. However, what is at stake in the document remains unclear, due to difficulty in situating calls for reform within a political wing that has urged an end to the Brotherhood’s policy of non-violence. Does the document represent a change in course, or is it simply a means to gain support from a political base? Observers suggest that the target audience is the MB membership, and that the document restates the front's criticism of the old guard and its management of the political developments in the 2011-2013. Its aims is to win over more members to the Kama Front by exposing the flaws of the old guard leadership. These are some of t...

Passive Young and the organizational crisis Second part on the "passive Ikhwan": https://www.sasapost.com/the-muslim-brotherhood-2-2/ الإخوان العدميون (2-2): من ورق البنا لورق «البفرة».. كيف تنظر الجماعة للظاهرة؟ Summary: The speaker of the "Maktab i3lami" wing, Muhammad Ghazi (a nom-de-guerre) asserts that such a phenomenon has been observed by the education department of the Jamaa, but that iit is limited to a small number of persons who suffered a psychological shock (sadma nafsiyya), mainly because of witnessing one of the "massacres". He claims that the tarbiya department is trying to help these people, regardless of the readiness or intention to return to "organizational discipline" (iltizam tanzimi). He futher states that laying all the blame for the catastrophy the persecution suffered by the Ikhwan on the old leadership is something that contradicts Ikhwani education, which stresses that you always have to have a dalil if yo...

On Mukammilin Channel, 14.4.2017 On the election of a new Hamas leadership and the Hamas charter A Hamas remake? #Occupation Azzam Tamimi Wednesday 19 April 2017 10:59 UTC Topics: Occupation Tags:  Hamas , Hamas Charter , Khaled Meshaal , Gaza Strip , West Bank Show comments As the Palestinian movement works to elect a leader to replace Khaled Meshaal, its new charter is clearer about what the movements stands for During the past 10 years, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) was the target of three major wars launched by Israel to destroy its military capabilities. Israel’s peace partner, the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority, sought more than just that: it wanted the movement dislodged from the Gaza Strip altogether so as to regain control of this enclave lost to Hamas in June 2007. In my opinion, the 1988 Hamas Charter was a badly writt...

  George Fahmi discusses how the MB old guard successfully managed to avert a turn to violence in the first half of 2015. Why Aren’t More Muslim Brothers Turning to Violence? | Chatham House After the 2013 military intervention against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, many voices warned that the Brotherhood would shift its tactics to include the use of violence. However, only a minority within the Brotherhood has decided to take up arms. While most policy attention focuses on the causes of radicalization, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt raises an equally important question: why, despite the measures adopted by the regime since 2013 against the Muslim Brotherhood, has only a small minority turned to violence? The answer is threefold: the position of the leadership, a recognition of the costs of violence and the Brotherhood’s idea of itself as non-violent. The removal of President Mohammed Morsi, a Brotherhood figure, from power in July 2013 and the ensu...