Policy Papers (Taqyimat) published by the "Kamal Front" inside the Ikhwan. What is it about?

MadaMasr, Arabic version, 21.3.2017
MadaMasr, English version, 22.3.2017

Muhammad Kamal wing manifesto

The Mohamed Kamal wing of the Muslim Brotherhood issued a report on Tuesday in which it took stock of the organization’s wider policies and strategic decisions in the leadup to the January 2011 revolution and the role it played afterwards. However, what is at stake in the document remains unclear, due to difficulty in situating calls for reform within a political wing that has urged an end to the Brotherhood’s policy of non-violence. Does the document represent a change in course, or is it simply a means to gain support from a political base?
Observers suggest that the target audience is the MB membership, and that the document restates the front's criticism of the old guard and its management of the political developments in the 2011-2013. Its aims is to win over more members to the Kama Front by exposing the flaws of the old guard leadership. These are some of the important points

Politics and charity

The document criticizes the group’s focus on charity work and its providing of services at the expense of a political vision for change. Since the Brotherhood was established in the 1920s, it has prioritized charitable initiatives over the development of political leaders within the organization and has reduced its support base to those who benefit from its services, the report reflects, which has alienated others.
The manifesto is critical of the performance of the party, although the terms of the criticism are hardly plausible:
There was a lack of preparation for inaugurating the party after the revolution, leading to confusion over the roles of the group and the party.
“The party was closer to being the political arm of the group than to being an independent entity,” the document argues.
This led to distraction from the group’s original purpose as a tool for political competition, as it became more involved in charitable projects and the provision of other services.
The document then goes on to criticise that the MB accepted the red lines set by the regime; after the revolution, it was too cautious amd conservative in its approach and did not have a revolutionary strategy:
The last section of the document discusses the group’s relationship to the revolution, arguing that it gave up on the founding ideals of Hassan al Banna, adopting a reformist approach that “was limited to disciplined political battles within the limits permitted by the regime.”
This, according to the document, “created an organizational framework that translated the revolution into procedures and contradicted the notion of a free-flowing, interactive and decisive revolution.”
Actually - vague as it is - this sounds more like the Qutbist ideas about revolution and transformation which were mostly borrowed from revolutionary left-wing thought. The underlying ideas seems to me that the revolution could have been an Islamic revolution if the Ikhwan had taken the lead. This is a totally different perspective from the one that argues that the Ikhwan should have created a more durable alliance with the non-Islamist revolutionaries. 

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